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A TRANSACTION THEORY OF CRIME?
George P. Fletcher*
I.
The most difficult questions are foundational. It is no surprise
then that one of the most puzzling questions in criminal law frames the
whole inquiry: what is the nature of crime? Positivists dispose of the
question easily. If the law is whatever the legislature and courts say it
is, then crime is whatever these authoritative agencies designate as
crime. The question becomes more interesting, however, if we regard
crime as a prepositive concept, a concept that exists logically prior to
the positive law. It is not that conduct is criminal because the legisla-
ture speaks; rather the legislature speaks because conduct is criminal.'
In the literature of criminal theory, particularly in West Germany,
there are two schools of thought about the nature of crime in the pre-
positive sense. One theory holds that crime consists of an assault on a
protected legal interest.2 The assault might yield harm, as in homicide,
rape, and arson. Or it might merely threaten harm, as in cases of at-
tempts and conspiracy. The other theory seeks to reduce all criminal
conduct to a breach of duty.3 The latter accounts for the traditional
offenses inflicting harm and sweeps up other acts, such as victimless
offenses, that threaten no apparent danger to a protected legal interest.
Of course, neither of these approaches to crime amounts to much un-
less we have a way of determining what is a "protected legal interest"
and what is a "duty." Positivists might co-opt these theories by treating
the positive law as conclusive on which interests should be protected
and which duties should not be breached. These competing theories
represent a challenge to the positivist conception of crime only if the
range of protected interests and relevant duties logically precedes the
positive law.
Prepositive theories of crime are substantive in that they assert
what crime really is. A substantive theory of crime might cover either
more or less than the acts the legislature formally designates as crimi-
nal. In his symposium article4 and in a prior article, 5 Professor
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1960, University of California at
Berkeley; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago.
1. The leading text in the English literature on legal positivism is H. Hart, The
Concept of Law (1961). Hart stresses the separation of law and morals as the central
premise of positivism. See id. at 181-82. For my own interpretation of legal positivism,
see Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 Yale LJ. 970, 973-79 (1981) (positivism
as a meta-theory on the nature of legal discourse).
2. H. Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts 6 (3d ed. 1978).
3. Id. (arguing that the two theories are reconcilable).
4. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85
Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1985).
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Klevorick proposes an alternative substantive theory about the nature
of crime. He claims that crime consists in acting contrary to society's
"transaction structure."'6 This is an intriguing claim. Although there
are many other aspects of Klevorick's work on crime, I should like to
concentrate on this point. Is the transaction theory of crime as good or
better than the alternative views expressed in the traditional literature?
It is important to be clear about the methodological status of the
argument that crime consists in acting contrary to "society's transaction
structure." Economists distinguish between positive and normative
analyses of legal phenomena, and to our possible confusion, they use
"positive" differently from philosophers. The transaction theory is
nonpositive in the philosophical sense, for it seeks to do more than de-
scribe the range of acts that legislatures brand as criminal. Yet the ar-
gument is positive in the economic sense, for it seeks to give us an
account of what crime really is, not to recommend changes in the en-
acted (positive) law. If the (economically) positive account is correct,
then it must account for a large part of the data that constitute the phe-
nomenon "criminal law." It need not account for all of the data; we
may assume that the legislature might call some acts "criminal" that are
not indeed criminal. The most that a theory of crime need do is explain
the range of acts that we regard as characteristically or paradigmatically
criminal. 7
There are in fact three distinct theories of crime that might fit
under the general label "an offense to society's transaction structure."
The first and narrowest theory holds that a crime occurs only when an
individual seizes for himself something (an entitlement) that he could
have bargained for. The purpose of punishment is to induce him to
change the means by which he acquires the desired entitlement. He
should enter into negotiations with the bearer of the entitlement and
offer sufficient consideration to induce a voluntary transfer. The ra-
tionale for requiring him to bargain is that only if the transaction is
consensual can we say that the transfer is "efficient" as a Pareto-supe-
rior move.8 Both parties stand to gain by the transfer; otherwise, they
would not consent. The crimes that most neatly fit this conception are
trespass to land and theft.9
A second and broader theory encompasses all acts that fall outside
5. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal Jus-
tice 289 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1985).
6. See Klevorick, supra note 4, at 908 ; KIevorick, supra note 5, at 301-04.
7. I will assume that we have a shared understanding of the core of the criminal law.
Undoubtedly, there might be disputes about whether some data at the fringes belong to
the core that requires explanation. For further thoughts on these methodological diffi-
culties, see G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 401-06 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 Hofstra L.
Rev. 509, 512-13 (1980) (A move is Pareto superior if it renders no one worse off and
the welfare of at least one person is improved.).
9. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 39-40, 121 (2d ed. 1977).
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the range of permissible transactions. This view of crime encompasses
transactions that are different not only in form from those that are per-
missible, but in substance as well. The narrower theory requires that
for every crime there be a consensual alternative. The broader theory
holds in addition that there are some voluntary transactions in which
the offender may not engage. The rationale for punishment under the
broader theory is not always to induce the offender to change the form
of his acquiring the desired entitlement, but in some cases to abandon
that desire altogether.
Both of these theories are to be contrasted with an allocative the-
ory of crime, which invokes hypothetical transactions in order to deter-
mine the ownership of the entitlement in question. The allocative
theory might explain certain institutions of the criminal law, such as the
defense of lesser evils. Yet the more challenging theories are those that
explain crime as the violation of an actual, not a hypothetical, transac-
tion structure. With some license, I shall use Klevorick's position as a
springboard for assessing the narrow theory, which claims more and
therefore poses a more interesting alternative to more conventional
views about the nature of crime. Klevorick also criticizes the narrow
transaction theory;10 my critique goes further by exploring a number of
ways in which the narrow theory offers an inadequate explanation of
the criminal law. In conclusion, I shall discuss the allocative theory and
its relationship to the narrow transaction theory.
II.
It is difficult to see how the narrow transaction theory helps us to
understand the difference between torts and crime. Trespass and theft
generate private causes of action as well as punishment for criminal
wrongdoing. The private remedy provides a sanction for breaching the
transaction structure. Why should that not be enough? From an eco-
nomic point of view, it seems highly questionable for the state to invest
in the costly measure of criminal prosecution when the tort remedy
might do thejob. Also, why should the state subsidize the processes of
detection, apprehension, and prosecution when it would seem more
sensible to allow private, aggrieved parties to decide whether to invest
in these activities? Criminal prosecution-particularly when it dupli-
cates the tort remedy-carries all the faults that free market economists
attribute to economic planning. The tort system reflects the principle
of consumer sovereignty in a free market. If detection, apprehension,
and sanctions are important to the victim, the tort system permits him
to decide whether to invest in a law suit. The contingent fee provides
access to this system even for indigent plaintiffs."
10. See Klevorick, supra note 4, at 906-07; Klevorick, supra note 5, at 301-04.
11. The analogy between the tort system and the free market obviously has its lim-
its. Law suits entail uncompensated costs that inhibit investment in "seeking justice."
1985] 923
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There are good reasons for imposing criminal sanctions in addi-
tion to making tort remedies available to victims. But the most persua-
sive considerations seem to be distinctly non- and even anti-economic.
Criminal punishment has a levelling effect, affecting both rich and poor
as individuals, not as economic actors. If killers and rapists were al-
lowed simply to pay off those victims (and families) who apprehended
and sued them, the rich would enjoy an intolerable privilege to force
the sale of lives and human dignity.
An important cleavage does in fact run between torts and crimes.
The distinction is not expressed well as that between a nonmoral tort law
and a moral criminal law. 12 For tort theories-both fault and strict lia-
bility-might be based on solid moral principles. 13 The cleavage is bet-
ter appreciated by taking note of the equal moral standing of all torts as
contrasted with the differential moral status of different crimes. There
is no gradation of torts, some more serious than others. 14 Battery is
not necessarily worse than defamation; an intentional tort is not per se
more serious than a negligent tort. It all depends on the harm done.
Even the slightest negligence, if sufficient to impose liability, can gener-
ate backbreaking liability for damages. The principles underlying tort
law sidestep the question whether the gravity of the act stands in
proper proportion to the degree of liability.
Criminal law differs. The system of crimes and punishments pre-
supposes that some crimes are more serious than others. Whether the
rationale of punishment is retribution or deterrence, the graver crimes
require more severe punishment. Yet this feature of crime, as opposed
to tort, eludes the narrow transaction theory. If all intentional crimes,
like all intentional torts, violate the transaction structure, then it is hard
to see how some should weigh more heavily in the balance than do
others. At least one of the standard theories of crime described earlier
captures this feature of graded criminality. If crime consists in an as-
sault on a legally protected interest, then assaults on the more serious
interests should be treated as more serious crimes. Life is more impor-
tant than property, and therefore homicide is a more serious offense
My only claim is that decentralized decisionmaking might be more efficient in this area
as often as it is in managing the economy.
12. Jerome Hall's claim that "moral culpability" is more important in criminal than
in tort law might be true in principle. See J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law
243 (2d ed. 1960). In the actual development of these fields, however, tort law may
reflect greater sensitivity to criteria of personal responsibility than do some formal doc-
trines of the criminal law, such as the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter
rules. See G. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 287-90.
13. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 539-40
(1972).
14. The commission of some torts might be so outrageous as to warrant punitive
damages. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts 9-11 (5th ed. 1984).
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than theft. This obvious feature of the criminal law does not lend itself
to explanation under the narrow transaction theory.
The narrow transaction theory of crime treats the criminal harm as
the violation of a single person's interest in not suffering the involun-
tary loss of his entitlements. The focus falls on the harm to a single
individual. Lost in this perspective is the widely held assumption that
criminal harms are not merely private and thus limited to the victim,
but public in their impact.' 5
The public nature of crime is reflected in Robert Nozick's account
of why we punish some harms that are compensable as well in tort.
16
The distinguishing characteristic of crime, Nozick argues, is the ele-
ment of fear.17 We are all affected by witnessing or hearing reports of
muggings, rapes, burglaries, and homicides. I am not sure why this is
so, but reports of deaths on the highways do not unnerve the public in
the way that reports of subway robberies put everyone in fear. If Bern-
hard Goetz had shot at an obviously. erratic and dangerous driver, eve-
ryone would have thought he was insane; his shooting at petty thieves
made him a national hero to many. The fear of crime touches a sensi-
bility far deeper than the fear of accidental injury. That additional fear
confers upon crime its public nature and, arguably, justifies the puni-
tive intervention of the state. Of course, it is not so easy to elicit this
public component in many property offenses and in victimless sexual
crimes. Though the public component is admittedly vague, there does
seem to be something more to crime than compensable harm to a sin-
gle individual.
If the narrow transaction theory of crime were correct, there would
be a voluntary transaction corresponding to every offense. This is the
case for trespass and theft. The use of land and title to goods can be
purchased as well as seized. But this is not true of certain offenses
where the policy of the legal system is to reject trading altogether.
Consent is not a defense, for example, to homicide, maiming, or statu-
tory rape. If death, mutilation, or sex with an underaged girl were a
desired good, it would not be a good available for purchase. Though
prohibitions may well reflect a paternalistic concern for whether indi-
viduals can consent to significant losses, they are nonetheless a wide-
spread feature of the criminal law. No account of the criminal law can
safely ignore these restrictions on consensual transactions. Admittedly,
the broader transaction theory can accommodate these cases of inalien-
able entitlements.is
15. See I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements ofJustice 99 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (lim-
iting punishment to public as opposed to private crimes).
16. See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). Battery is an example of a
harm compensable in tort and punishable under the criminal law.
17. Id. at 67.
18. For further elaboration on this theme, see Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and
the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931 (1985).
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The idea of a transactional alternative to the crime means that the
offender can acquire, in a voluntary transaction, the good that he seeks
by committing the crime. Instead of stealing an object, he can acquire
it by paying for it. Instead of trespassing, he can purchase access. This
is not always the case. Sometimes the point of a crime consists not in
acquiring a particular entitlement, but in subjecting the victim to the
involuntary loss of the entitlement. Rape is the best example. What
rapists typically seek-namely, the subjection and humiliation of the
victim-cannot be sought out and purchased in a voluntary transaction.
If the victim consents, in advance, to being ravaged when he or she
least expects it, this might seem like a consent to rape, but the rapist
who agrees to this transaction loses what might well be the point of
violent attack.19 If the victim agrees, he or she is no longer victimized,
since at least according to current views of the crime, victimization is
the point of the sexual assault. In all cases where, as in rape, the crimi-
nal means are essential to the actor's motives, it is simply false to con-
ceptualize the crime as the evasion of an available transactional
alternative. There is no transaction structure to offend against.
Several other types of crime do not fit readily into the narrow
transaction theory. Attempts are not simply voluntary trades carried
out by other means, for attempts are failed efforts to bring about harm.
If we punish consummated criminal acts in order to channel behavior
back into the transactional structure, it would hardly make sense to
punish attempts in order to channel these failures back into the market
of voluntary exchanges. Society has no interest in encouraging abor-
tive efforts to trade entitlements.
Another set of crimes that falls outside the narrow transaction the-
ory consists of all those crimes that, in more conventional views, are
seen as crimes against the government. Consider counterfeiting and
interfering with the administration ofjustice. Do these acts circumvent
possible transactions with the government by which would-be offenders
would bargain for the right to print money or tamper with the
processes ofjustice? I suppose one could imagine the government sell-
ing these rights to individuals, yet these transactions would hardly
make economic sense. In both cases significant externalities would fall
on parties other than the purchasing actor and the government. If the
price of printing one thousand one-hundred dollar bills were such that
someone had an incentive to print the bills, the public would suffer in
direct proportion to the gain received by the purchasing printer. If
someone could purchase the right to tamper with ajury or commit per-
jury, the externalities would fall on the people whose fates turned on
the distorted judicial process. The full price for these extraordinary
rights to print money and to interfere with the organs ofjustice would
19. See Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice, 1979 Wis. L. Rev.
799, 804-08.
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have to reflect the internalization of costs falling on third parties. If
these costs were properly internalized, one might wonder whether a
sale of the right in question here would still be thinkable.
This analysis reveals that the transaction theory of crime holds only
where the harm falls exclusively on the victim who might consent to
trading an entitlement in a voluntary transaction. In all other cases,
some externalities would fall on third parties. If these externalities are
not internalized (if, for example, transaction costs prohibit affected
third parties from bargaining with the party seeking the entitlement),
the price will be too low: it will not reflect the impact of the act on the
public as a whole. Yet the public dimension of crime is indispensable in
distinguishing crimes from torts. The element of generalized fear is an
externality that justifies the state's intervention. 20 Indeed, one might
well argue not that the crime is an offense against the transaction struc-
ture, but that because no transaction can possibly internalize the exter-
nality of fear, the state must punish as well as provide a remedy for tort
damages. The narrow transaction theory may provide a good account
of some torts, such as trespass and theft, but it fails to capture the sali-
ent features of criminal law.
III.
The transaction theory poses additional problems when it comes
into conflict with the allocative theory of entitlements. Both theories
wind their way through the literature of economics and law. The nar-
row transaction theory holds, as we have noted, that individuals should
not be allowed to circumvent the transaction structure when bargaining
for entitlements is possible. The core example is the trespasser who
parks in another's garage when it would be possible for him to buy
permission to use the garage. 21 The allocative theory holds that when
the impediments to bargaining-information and transaction costs-
become too high, the entitlement should be allocated to that person in
the conflict who, in Calabresi's inventive phrase, would be the "cheap-
est cost avoider." 22 The cheapest cost avoider is that party who would,
in a hypothetical transaction, pay more for the entitlement in question
or who would be in the best position to trade the entitlement to the
party who values it most highly. 23 The standard example for the alloca-
tive theory is Coase's parable of the railroad emitting sparks and the
farmer who suffers a resulting loss of grain. 24 The problem is allocat-
ing the incompatible entitlement (the right either to emit or to be free
from sparks) to the party who values it more highly.
20. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
21. See R. Posner, supra note 9, at 39-40.
22. G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, 143-52 (1970).
23. Id.
24. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & Econ. 1, 29-30 (1960) (using
Pigou's example, see A. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 134 (4th ed. 1932)).
1985] 927
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Both the narrow transaction and allocative theories purport to seek
the efficient solution. Efficiency obtains when the party who values an
entitlement most highly acquires it. Where unimpeded bargaining is
possible, the transaction theory holds that individuals must actually
trade; the car parker must pay for the privilege of parking in the garage.
Where bargaining is not possible, the state must intervene and allocate
the entitlement (the right to act or prevent action) to the party who
would acquire it under conditions of costless bargaining. The railroad
need not pay for the damage done by its sparks if it would pay more for
the right to emit the sparks than the farmer would pay for the right to
be free from fires. If the entitlement is assigned to the party that values
it most highly, the net gain to that person exceeds the loss to persons
who are thereby affected. This net gain makes the allocation efficient.
The transaction and allocative theories of efficiency bear a superfi-
cial resemblance, but in fact they differ radically. The narrow transac-
tion theory requires actual bargaining and payment for the transfer of
entitlements. It affirms the existing allocation of entitlements and the
sovereignty of the two parties in deciding whether a trade should occur.
If the railroad parks its engines on a particular farmer's land, it must
pay to do so. The allocative theory holds, in contrast, that when bar-
gaining is impractical, the existing allocation of entitlements is subject
to reassessment. If the railroad sparks damage many farmers' grain,
then the cost of bargaining may become so high as to effectively impede
bargaining, and for that reason alone, the right of the farmers to enjoy
their land without interference comes into question. They must, in
principle, be willing to pay the railroad to leave them alone; their grain
must be worth more to them than emitting sparks is worth to the
railroad.
The allocative theory accounts for some institutions of the criminal
law. The defense of lesser evils, for example, represents exactly the
kind of reassessment of entitlements that the allocative theory ex-
plains. 25 Under emergency conditions, the law protecting certain enti-
tlements might give way to a reallocation of entitlements. If a fetus
threatens the life or health of the woman bearing it, the fetus' entitle-
ment to life might have to yield to the mother's entitlements to health,
privacy, and life. If a ship is endangered in a storm and seeks moorage
at a privately owned dock, the dock owner might be held to waive his
right to control access to the dock. The conventional mode of analyz-
ing these issues stresses the relative importance of the competing inter-
ests. The allocative theory provides an account, first, of why an
involuntary reallocation is necessary (bargaining is impossible under
emergency conditions) and second, of what it means in economic terms
25. On lesser evils, see Model Penal Code § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1952);
Strafgesetzbuch § 34 (W. Ger.).
928 [Vol. 85:921
TRANSACTION THEORY
to say that one interest is more valuable than others (the affected party
would be willing to pay more for it).
If the allocative theory were consistently applied to the criminal
law, however, it would generate some peculiar results. Consider drunk
driving. If only one driver were endangered by the drinker, the narrow
transaction theory would require the drinker and the second driver to
negotiate a price for the latter's loss of safety. If the endangered driver
does not accept the price, the drinker's threatening conduct would vio-
late his entitlement to safety; if he does accept the price and consents to
the drunk driver's risk-creation, his consent would preclude a finding
that the driver's behavior is criminal.
As the number of drinking drivers increases, the possibilities and
risks of an accident that would injure the single sober driver multiply.
Under the circumstances, it becomes easier for the sober driver to pay
each of the drunks to stay home rather than for the several drinking
drivers to consolidate and offer a single price to the sober potential
victim to waive his claim to safety. As a result, the right of the sober
driver to be immune from the risks created by drunk driving would
come into question. The entitlement to safety would depend on how
much the sober driver was willing, hypothetically, to pay the drinkers
for desisting. Because we might not be able to determine whether this
hypothetical payment is greater than the hypothetical amount the
drinkers would offer, the allocative theory requires that we assign the
entitlement (either to drive drunk or to drive sober without drunks
around) to that person or group who would have the greatest impedi-
ments to purchasing that entitlement if they in fact valued it more
highly than the opposing group. As we shift from one potential injurer
to many, we increase the transaction costs on the side of the injurers
and generate a good argument under the allocative theory for assigning
the entitlement to drink and drive to the potential drunks. This is a
remarkable maneuver. If there is one person endangering another, the
entitlement is secure, and violating it, without consent, would be pun-
ished as a crime. If more people are creating the danger, the entitle-
ment comes into question. It would be a curious theory of crime that
would treat risks created by gangs more leniently than risks created by
individuals.
It seems questionable to advance both the transaction theory,
which treats entitlements as fixed, and the allocative theory, which po-
tentially reassigns entitlements, in the same theoretical matrix. The
very least we should demand of law and economics is a meta-theory
explaining when, in principle, the transaction theory gives way to the
allocative theory. It would make perfectly good sense to insist, for ex-
ample, that the theories must operate at different stages of social plan-
ning. The allocative theory responds to the problem of distributive
justice: it establishes the basic entitlements prior to the beginning of
social and economic relations. The transaction theory responds to the
1985] 929
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problem of commutative justice: when entitlements already assigned
may be permissibly transferred. It is true that from an economic point
of view efficiency may inform both distributive and commutative deci-
sions. The common label of efficiency, however, should not induce the-
orists to mix, without better foundations, the allocative and transaction
theories in solving legal problems.
The transaction and allocative theories reflect, in fact, different
concepts of legal relations. The transaction theory starts with the as-
sumption that two distinct individuals desire to use a single resource.
Their conflict should be resolved, if possible, by a voluntary arrange-
ment between them. The allocative theory, inspired by the Coase theo-
rem,26 treats the two claimants as aspects of a single entity whose
overall efficiency is to be maximized. Their conflict is resolved by ad-
vancing the interests of a single firm of which they are both part. This
explains why, under the hypothetical bidding for the single resource,
the recipient of the entitlement need not compensate the losing
party.2 7 Both winners and losers are facets of the same social
organism.
Crime may have external effects on the public as a whole, but the
offender and the potential victim remain entirely distinct individuals.
Crime cannot properly be understood simply as a misallocation of re-
sources within the same social organism. The allocative theory might
serve for many to illuminate the law of torts, but it has no place as an
explanation for a body of law that stresses the distinctness of injurer
and victim.
Neither the allocative nor the narrow version of the transaction
theory provides a good account of the criminal law. It is true that some
crimes might appear to be impermissible alternatives to what one
should only do on the basis of consensual agreement. But the data
thereby explained are but a pocket of the criminal law. Yet there is
something to be learned even from a theory that fails in its purpose.
Both the transaction and allocative theories of crime remind us of sev-
eral features of the legal system that we might otherwise overlook.
26. See Coase, supra note 24, at 40.
27. This standard is generally called the Kaldor-Hicks test or potential Pareto supe-
riority. See Coleman, supra note 8, at 513. So far as I know, the test came into currency
in American legal circles with Michelman's analysis of efficient takings in Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compen-
sation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-18 (1967).
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